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Reindustrialization and the Future of Social Welfare
Steve Burghardt, M.S.W., Ph.D. Michael Fabricant, Ph..
Hunter College Hunter College
ABSTRACT
"Reindustrialization" is a term of economic complexity and great, if confused,
social implications to most human service workers. Human services workers
can only challenge the plans envisioned by most reindustrialists if certain
arguments and assumptions are understood. This article will lay out the
reindustrialists plans and assumptions. It will also develop some of the
reasons why such ideas, as they are now formulated, cannot work -- in terms
based on common experiences highly familiar to every human service worker.
Introduction
"Reindustrialization", with its discussions of economic expansion, investment
rates for flagging industries, and the flight of capital, once irritated or
confused social service workers with its complex jargon and stringent
economic emphasis. Today, the term no longer irritates but more likely
terrifies; if its economic complexity is not entirely understood, its social
service implications are totally apparent. What five years ago was a gloomy
distraction looming off on some distant horizon ( a horizon perhaps casting
brighter hues in the South and South West) is in the 1980's a stark fact of
life that everyone in social services must understand, react to, and
challenge for their very survival.
That challenge can only occur if one is able to dissect the plans of the
reindustrialists clearly. This article will delineate the basic outlines
of the dominant argument, tracing the history of the issue, the basic
economic problems, and the contending plans proposed to revitalize our
economy. It also will lay out some of the reasons why such plans, as they
are now formulated, cannot work -- in terms that every social worker can
understand and use to begin effectively challenging present assumptions
about how and why our economy must be revitalized.
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Histor5: From "Urban Fiscal Crisis" to "Crisis of Capital Formation"
During the past twenty-five years a complex set of social forces have adversely
affected the fiscal stability and quality of life in many American's cities.
The factor most frequently identified as having contributed to the destabili-
zation of these urban areas is the relocation of business enterprises (Sale,
1975). The first stage of this period was marked by a substantial flight of
capital and jobs from certain industrialized cities to outlying suburban and
rural communities. The change was described as a natural consequence of
capital flowing to those geographic areas that offered the greatest oppor-
tunities for profit maximazation, as these rural and suburban communities
had a relatively cheap labor force and low rates of taxation.
Over the years, many cities, especially in the North and North East, have
been unable to stem this tide of relocation and abandonment. Over time,
decision-making of certain private - sector industries to relocate created a
cycle of economic contraction and spiraling social costs that government
officials were unable to break. As business left urban areas, the revenue
available in these locales for services and the maintenance of its infra-
structure also diminished. The loss of industrial jobs, however, placed
pressure upon these urban areas to deliver increased services to an in-
creasingly unskilled and unemployed populace.
These social costs in turn accelerated the process of urban abandonment by
both business and the middle-class. Those remaining in the city demanded
to be protected from what they perceived to be an upsurge in crime against
individuals and property. Consequently, local and state governments in the
past five years have increased their outlay for prisons, police and courts
(Reiman, 1981). This relocation of resources however, further eroded
the infra-structure and remaining service base. As a result mass transit
breakdowns and the numbers of thoroughfares which are in states of disrepair
for extended periods of time have increased dramatically during the past
decade, which further damaged the business climate (Etzioni, 1980). The
quality and quantity of sanitation, education and other human services has
also rapidly eroded during this period.
By the mid-1970's, however, it was becoming clear that the crisis gripping
many of America's urban areas was not an isolated phenomenon. During the
past decade the United States for the first time experienced both sky-
rocketing inflation and widespread unemployment (Silk, 1981). Such
problems revealed a national economic crisis characterized by declining
rates of growth and productivity. By the late 1970's, it was clear that
many industries, especially those regarded as the backbone of American
economic strength (steel, auto, rubber) were no longer internationally
competitive.
In short, by 1980 the fiscal crisis could no longer be exclusively de-
scribed in terms of specific urban areas being less efficient or less
profitable than suburban and/or rural areas. The "fiscal crisis" was now
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a 'capital crisis", complete with problems that afflict large segments of
the private sector as seriously as urban areas. And, not surprisingly,
many state governments and the Federal government are now described as being
on the brink of fiscal collapse (Anderson, 1981).
It is most important to note that an increasingly apparent regional exception
to this widespread and persistent phenomenon are parts of the South and West.
Recent reports suggest that these areas of the country are prospering during
this era of more general decline (Sale, 1980). Their present status as the
economically stable and/or growth areas of the nation can be traced to at
least two factors. Parts of this region, most noticeably Louisiania, Texas
and Oklahoma, are in the enviable position of being energy exporters during
a period of energy scarcity (Rifkin, 1979). Secondly, those qualities that
made rural and suburban areas adjacent to industrial cities attractive to
mobile capital in the 50's and 60's has also guaranteed in the short term
an immediate expansion of this region's industrial base (Rifkin, 1979). The
non-unionized status of labor in this area of the country affords many
industries a relatively cheap work-force. Favorable taxation policies have
also induced businesses to invest in the South and South west.*
Factors Contributing to the Recent Economic Decline
The broad economic crisis presently affecting every sector of America's
society has been attributed to a range of highly interrelated factors that
human service workers need to understand. It will be the purpose of this
section to identify and briefly describe those forces that have contributed
to this economic decline.
Declining Productivity
The international competitiveness of the United States has dropped pre-
cipitously during the last decade. The nation is less able to compete with
foreign industries in such central areas as steel, auto, and textiles. During
the past decade it has been suggested that U.S. products are inferior on the
basis of quality and cost to those being produced in other countries, most
notably Japan and Germany. Consequently our share of the foreign and domestic
markets in steel, autos, and textiles has contracted. This contraction has
been accompanied by the reduced use of our plant capacity in these industries.
Such retrenchment has also affected a significant increase in the rates of
unemployment within each of these sectors of the economy (Lohr, 1981).
It is interesting to note that certain areas of the South and Southwest are
already beginning to experience the strains of rapid expansion and dis-
location. The social costs of this expansion have mushroomed in Phoenix,
Houston, and New Orleans (Sale, 1980). It would appear that the presently
vibrant economy of the Sun Belt will not escape the twin crisis of urban
decay and economic decline. Where would relocation be after that?
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Capital Investment
It has been suggested that the amount and direction of capital investment by
U.S. industry is not adequate to meet the challenge of foreign competition.
The declining profits of American industries have made it increasingly diffi-
cult to keep pace with the technological and plant investments being made
by competitors from other nations. Consequently, American products are
increasingly more costly and less effective than their competitors. Recent
reports also indicate that when capital has been made available American
industries have failed to make appropriate investments. For example, during
a period of energy scarcity the American automobile industry failed to re-
tool its plants to produce more efficient cars. This decision was made
despite the availability of capital and contributed to the steep decline In
productivity within industry. Relatedly, the American steel industry
developed technologies which substantially reduced the unit costs of pro-
ducing a ton of steel. Instead ofimnaking the capital investments necessary
to immediately apply this technology, steel manufacturers chose to continue
operating with their less efficient plants (Lohr, 1981). The Japanese,
however, discovered, refined, and applied these techniques, much to their
advantage.
Inflationary Spiral
As was suggested earlier, inflation has become an almost characteristic
feature of the American economy. In recent years the inflationary spiral
has begun to accelerate. This is in part a consequence of the inflationary
expectations that have been built into the economy (Silk, 1980). In effect,
manufacturers and labor establish the future price of their goods and
services in relation to the rate of inflation. Each group wishes to advance
economically and consequently demands a price or wage increase beyond the
rate of inflation. This dynamic is repeated throughout the economy and
effectively guarantees increased rates of inflation over time.
An increase in the inflation rate also affects a corresponding rise
in the prime interest rate (Silk, 1981). Consequently ailing industries
troubles are further compounded by the necessity of borrowing at high rates
during a period that demands relatively substantiallreturns on investment
capital. These circumstances may discourage borrowing which in turn reduces
these companies investments.in new equipment and technology. Such a decision
then adversely affects the competitive position of a corporation over time.
Alternatively desperate companies might borrow beyond their capacity to repay
and thus mortgage the future health of the firm, all of which destabilizes
the economy even more.
Short-Term Planning
In recent years American industries' emphasis upon short-term profit margins
has undermined its competitive standing. This imperative has reduced various
corporations' capacity to develop investment policies which favor the long-
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term intersts of the industry. The focus upon short-term growth demands
investment policies which yield immediate dividends. This approach fre-
quently requires that industries invest or diversify their capital in other
already profitable areas of the economy. Concomitantly, these decisionmakers
are less inclined to update the equipment, technology and labor skill of the
parent industry because of the substantial outlay and negligible payoff
initially associated with such policies. It has been suggested that this
almost exclusive reliance upon short-term profit margins as a barometer of
corporate health effectively undermined the productivity and competitive
standing of a number of America's basic industries.
Secondly, American managers are increasingly selected to lead a corporation
on the basis of their financial expertise. Conversely this decisionmaker is
generally less attuned than his corporate predecessors to the particular
characteristics of a product or an organization. The new decisionmakers
are characterized by a set of skills which (1) are transferable between
industries and (2) emphasize interorganizational investment or diversifi-
cation as a means of increasing the profit margins of a parent industry.
Policies of the Public Sector
Recent criticism suggests that the public sector has contributed to the
decline of American productivity. These reports have indicated that the
taxation policies of the Federal government and certain states have not
encouraged corporations to invest their profits in long-term capital
expenditure projects such as plant renewal and technological development
(Bluestone et.al., 1980 and Rohatyn 1981). Instead these formulas have
focused on the short-term profits and circumstance of American industries.
Consequently the Reagan Presidency and both Houses of Congress have
recommended an accellerated depreciation allowance for plants and equip-
ment. This tax incentive plan is expected to revive industry by en-
couraging corporate executives to rebuild their plants and invest in the
development and application of advanced technology.
Furthermore, the proportion of the G.N.P. absorbed by the public sector,
especially human services, is viewed as economically unproductive. It
has been argued that the government employs essential capital in various
types of service programs which do not contribute directly to the in-
dustrial expansion of the society. Certain critics have therefore
suggested that much of this capital should be redirected to industries
that require huge sums of money to finance their future stability and
* The short-term investment policies of American industry can be traced to
at least two variables. The structure of American corporations almost
by defination insists that corporate managers focus upon short-term
objectives. In effect, the validity of an American corporation is de-
fined to a significant extent by its quarterly dividends and report.
Therefore short-term diversification policies rather than long-term
capital investment plans have been emphasized by American corporate
manaaers (Lohr. 1981).
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expansion and in turn the larger societies (Rohatyn, 1981).
Finally, the regulatory policies of government have been identified by some
as cumbersome and costly. Various industries have suggested that these
regulations increase the costs of producing a good or service. Consequently
they have charged that government regulations contribute to the
(1) inflationary spiral, (2) decline in capital available for long-term
investment and (3) energy industries inability to discover new sources of
domestic oil or gas and thus the nations increased dependence upon foreign
reserves. Many industries have therefore demandcd a sweeping deregulation
of government standards that they feel have affected the practices of the
private sector.
Responding to the Problem: The Stockman and Rohatyn Plans
Two plans have recently emerged as a real and potential line of attack on the
economic ills of the United States. Felix Rohatyn and David Stockman are most
frequently identified with these two economic packages. The Stockman plan
has been adopted by the Reagan administration and presently is being con-
sidered by the U.S. Congress. It is consonant with the point of view of the
conservative wing of the Republican Party. Just as importantly, the more
moderate segments of the Republican Party have accepted a number of this plans
basic premises (Weisman, 1981 and Silk, 1980).
Alternatively the Rohatyn plan has been described by a number of liberal
journals as a potentially useful platform for the Democrat Party (Rohatyn, 1981).
The recent failures of traditional liberal ideology, the present ideological
void of the Democrat Party and Rohatyns role in "reviving" the New York City
economy with a similar plan suggest that this approach may underpin the
policies of the Democratic Party in the latter half of the decade.
The Stockman prescription recommends laissez faire policies of the 19th century
as an antidote to the present ills of the American economy. This approach is
based on supply-side economics which presumes that the transfer of capital from
the public-sector to the private will increase the productivity of that capital
and thus increase the output and employment capacity of the entire society.
The more rapid the transfer of capital, the more quickly the economy will grow.
It is on this basis that the Stockman plan emphasized tax cuts for business.
It also was intended to cut taxes to individuals, especially to the more
affluent wage earner. The rationale for favoring the interest of business and
the affluent is that these segments of the society are most likely to invest
their tax savings and thus contribute to a more robust economy
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Furthermore, the architects of this plan insist that tax cuts be made con-
current with a balanced Federal budget (which will decrease inflation) and
increases in defense expenditures (which will invigorate the economy).
During a period of modest economic growth it is therefore assured that
there will be substantial cuts in human services spending. The savings
made from the service cuts can then be used as initial revenues for the
defense increase. The deeper the cuts, of course, the easier it will be
to balance the budget at the same time.
The Stockman plan also intends to deregulate specific Federal standards
and laws. This policy would lift price ceilings on oil and gas as well as
open environmentally protected lands to energy exploration. This deregu-
lation is expected to provide the energy industry with the necessary
capital and incentive to expand their domestic output of energy. An in-
crease in domestic production and greater conservation of oil because of
the higher price is expected to reduce this nation's dependence on foreign
oil. This combination of factors is expected to reduce inflation and
increase the efficiency as well as productivity of the economy.
Numtrous critics have pointed out the endemic tensions in this design. We
will mention a few economic ones in this section. The Stockman plan pre-
sumes that it can reduce inflation while cutting taxes. At the very least
such a premise is inconsistent with recent historic data (Rothschild, 1981).
Secondly, it seems highly questionable that the huge outlays for defense,
coupled with the diminished tax revenues, make it possible to balance the
Federal budget. Finally, a policy directed toward the deregulation of
energy and increased exploration of oil or gas in environmentally pro-
tected lands presumes that the energy companies will use their greater
profits to expand domestic energy supplies by further developing tradi- ,
tional and alternative sources of energy. The previous sections of the
analysis, however, suggest that the present predisposition of American
companies is to invest on the basis of short-term profits. Consequently,
the greater profits of the oil industry may not contribute to more long-
term investments in energy exploration, but rather an accellerated effort
to diversify their portfolio of profitable holding companies (Bluestone
et.al., 1980 and Lohr, 1981).
The Rohatyn Plan
A second plan has been developed by Felix Rohatyn, the former head of the
Emergency Financial Control Board of the City of New York. Given the
problems in Stockman's program, it may become increasingly attractive in
the mid-1980's, and thus deserves careful scrutiny. He generally proposes
that "to develop the parts of the United States that are failing, a
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (R.F.C.), should be created in the 1980's.'
(Rohatyn, 1981). The R.F.C. would be based on the N.Y.C. Emergency Financial
Control Board Model in as much as it would require a partnership between the
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financial community, public sector and labor. Mr. Rohatyn suggests that the
R.F.C. would be generally intended to:
"...restructure basic U.S. Industries, to enable them to
take their place as healthy competitors in the world
markets; and to develop a regional policy whose aim will
be to maintain the U.S. as a country in which all geo-
graphic areas (and thereby all classes and races) share
the burdens and benefits this country has to offer."
(Rohatyn, 1981).
The primary function of the R.F.C. would be to provide equity capital to our
older industries. These resources would be distributed to those industries
and regions most desperately in need of such financing. This would specifi-
cally result in an infusion of capital to the older urban areas and troubled
industries of the Northeast and Midwest. These monies would be used to pro-
vide low interest, long term loans to municipalities and certain industries.
Such capital would enable local governments to rebuild portions of their
infrastructure (sewers, bridges, mass transit, roads, etc.). Just as
importantly, those faltering industries which are considered to have a
realistic chance of long-term survival would be the beneficiaries of such a
plan.
The R.F.C. would be structured along the lines of the New York Municipal
Assistance Corporation. It would be publicly accountable but according to
Rohatyn, run outside of politics. This quasi-public organization then would
be able to provide capital and "negotiate the concessions that have to come
with it." Rohatyn Identifies a number of potential sources of capital for
this reconstruction plan. Large lending firms such as banks and insurance
companies might be persuaded to convert some loans to preferred stock and
commit additional capital to this project. Special classes of security
could be created to enable unions to invest a portion of their pension funds.
Finally, this Federally guaranteed investment might attract the surplus
capital of a number of O.P.E.C. nations.
The favored investment position of certain industries and municipalities
however, would be achieved at substantial costs. The R.F.C. would demand
"stringent concessions" from those parties most directly benefiting from
such loans (Rohatyn, 1981). Rohatyn refers to the New York City experience
to illustrate the types of concessions. Relevant unions would be required
to tradeoff wage concessions and work rules that diminish productivity for
increased job security. Local governments would have to balance their
budgets within a relatively brief period of time. Alternatively, loans to
the private sector might require phasing out weaker parts of certain in-
dustries, the modification of labor contracts and an ongoing search for
ways to increase budgets within a relatively brief period of time.
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The potential implications of this apparently redistributive plan must be
examined closely. It is important to note that the resources for this pro-
ject will in general have to be released from the most capital rich segments
of the domestic economy. Rohatyn suggests that banks and insurance companies
must provide a substantial amount of the capital necessary to fuel this pro-
ject. Given the magnitude of their investment, these financiers will in all
likelihood demand to monitor the direction of and return on their capital
outlay. This condition of investment would be translated into the sub-
stantial if not dominant presence of these institutions on the R.F.C. board.
As Rohatyn has noted, representatives of labor and the public sector would
also sit on this board. It must be presumed, however, that their roles and
influence to a great extent will be defined by their capacity to finance this
project, one admittedly weaker during this period of economic decline
(Rifkin, 1979).
Furthermore, only certain segments of the private sector will be able to
contribute to the R.F.C. Many industries have also experienced steady
decline during the past ten years. The portion of the economy most able
to direct substantial sums of capital to the R.F.C. are those industries
that have maintained or increased their profit margins during the past
decade (Rohatyn, 1981 and Tabb, 1981). In order for a growth industry to
participate, it must have very substantial profits and significant sums of
excess or equity capital. In effect then, those segments of the society
which play an increasingly dominant role in shaping economic decision making
will be asked to finance reconstruction. Given this plan's dependence upon
significant sums of private sector capital, there would seem to be little
alternative to that dominance. This dominance would ultimately mean that
the most powerful monopolistic sectors of the economy would be formally de-
fining the public policy of the late 1980's.
Other consequences of this plan more specifically affect the long-term
interests of unions and the service sector of the economy. It would appear
that certain independent functions of unions would be seriously compromised
by the demands of this fresh infustion of capital into suffering industries
and regions. Additionally, the requirement that Metropolitan areas maintain
a balanced budget effectively underwrites a gradual contraction of various
services. The experience in New York City suggests that there will be
substantial shrinkage in the sanitation, education, health, regulatory and
housing sectors of the service economy. Additionally, certain elements of
the city's infrastructure have also been allowed to deteriorate (roads,
subways, etc.). In effect, the City had to tradeoff certain services and
the maintenance of its physical plant to achieve a balanced budget in the
short-run. These same tradeoffs will be demanded of Metropolitan areas
and regions that must do business with the R.F.C.
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Comparison of the Two Plans
The Rohatyn and Stockman plans do have distinctive features. The former plan
relies on a formal partnership between business, labor and government. The
idealized intentions of this plan are a fundamentally liberal formulation
which sees public or quasi-public mechanisms as a means of reviving private
capital. It intends to minimize the short-term discomforts of the flight of
capital from Northeastern and Midwestern urban areas. Unlike Stockman, the
Rohatyn plan dictates the gradual, but pronounced contraction of basic
services. This policy effectively combines many of the characteristics of
neo-liberal ideology which is being articulated and developed by the
Democratic Party's emergent leadership. The R.F.C. is therefore likely to
be a centerpiece of the Democratic Party's economic policies in the 1980's.
The Stockman plan represents a more conservative definition of and response
to the present economic decline. It differs from the Rohatyn plan inasmuch
as it is dependent upon a rapid contraction of services. Relatedly the
plan's laissez faire underpinnings implicitly encourage the continued, rapid
transfer of capital from the North to the South. Stockman's policy is there-
fore likely to trigger a substantial reaction from those regions and elements
of the population that are adversely affected by this rapid transfer of
wealth.
Ultimately, however, these conservative and neo-liberal conceptions of the
present problems and their solutions are fundamentally parallel. Each will
contribute to further consolidations of power within the private sector.
Concomitantly, each of these approaches will oversee a transfer of various
kinds of decision making and power from the government to the private sector.
Finally, the Rohatyn and Stockman plans guarantee that the service base of
municipalities within the Northeast and Midwest will contract substantially
during the 1980's.
The Service Economy
Nevertheless, the Rohatyn and Stockman plans most fatal flaw is their common
misreading of the present and future structure of the American economy.
Their approaches insist that American capital be invested in traditional
goods producing industries. These industries are considered the primary
foundation upon which the future economic structure of the society must be
built. Perhaps most importantly, the resources for this reconstruction of
basic industries will (in great part) be drawn from the service sectors of
the economy, sectors expected to contract drastically in the coming years.
The rationale for this redistribution of resources is that traditional manu-
facturing sectors of the economy have a greater productive capacity than
service industries and are therefore able to contribute more to the present
and future health of the economy.
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These analyses, however, have paid insignificant attention to the vital link
between service industries and the present as well as future development of
the economy. As Emma Rothchild has indicated, of the five major industrial
nations, the U.S. has the lowest proportion of its civilian population em-
ployed in industries defined as manufacturing, mining and construction
(Rothschild, 1981). In this sector of the economy, the U.S. employs 30%
of its civilian population compared to 44% in West Germany or 38% in
Britain (Rothschild, 1981). Just as importantly, the positions are the
same if we isolate manufacturing: the U.S. has less than 23% of its total
civilian employment in manufacturing, compared to 35% for Germany, 27% for
France and 25% for Sweden. The Rohatyn and Stockman plans' presumption that
this sector of the economy is capable of functioning as the primary source
of employment would seem to be misguided in both relative and absolute terms.
The conservative and liberal formulations of reconstruction are also not
consonant with the present trends of the economy. As Rothschild indicates
food, health and business services produced more than three million new jobs
between 1973 and 1979. This sector of the economy generated more than 40%
of the new private jobs created between 1973 and the summer of 1980. These
three service industries' employment increased three times as fast as total
private employment and sixteen times as fast as employment in the goods
producing or industrial sectors of the economy.
Eli Ginzberg has suggested that the contribution of government services to
the economy is far greater than generally imagined. He suggests that when
"the contribution of the private non-profit sector is added to that of
government, the not-for-profit sector accounts for more than a third of the
total employment and nearly a third of the G.N.P. (Ginzberg, 1981). He also
rejects the notion that such employment and expenditure are at a cost to
the "productive" side of the economy. Ginzberg's analysis is persuasive:
"The argument...is belied by the historical record of
the very period that has seen the rapid expansion of the
not-for-profit sector. For the past several decades, the
agricultural and the automotive industries were the
movers and shakers of the economy both at home and abroad.
The role of Federal government expenditures in research
and development and in the operation of the agricultural
extension service, which was in effect a technology transfer
enterprise, was crucial to the enormous gains of output per
man hour and per acre of the country's farms. Similarly,
it was Federal, State and local outlays for highway building,
greatly enhanced by the Eisenhower administration's interstate
highway legislation of 1956 that contributed to the prolonged
prosperity of the automobile industry..." (Ginzberg, 1981).
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Ginzberg's most compelling argument concerning the value of services to the
present structure and future development of the economy relies upon the con-
cept of human capital. He indicates that between 1950 and 1979, total
expenditures for education increased from 8.3 to 151.5 billion dollars
(Ginzberg, 1981). Approximately 125 billion of this total investment was
made by the public sector. Investments in higher education increased 30
times from 1.7 to 48.9 billion dollars. The public treasury covered two-
thirds of this expenditure. Finally, during this same period, investments
in research and development jumped from 13.5 to 57.6 billion dollars. The
government covered approximately two-thirds of this bill in 1960 and
approximately 50% in 1979 (Ginzberg, 1981).
Ginzberg also notes that increased human capital formation was facilitated
by the substantial investment in the country's health care system between
1950 and 1980. This expansion was stimulated by expenditures from both
government and non-profit institutions such as Blue Cross. He suggests
that "in 1950, expenditures for medical care were 42 billion with consumers
paying $4 of every $5. In 1980 these expenditures had climbed to 240 billion
with the government providing $2 out of every $5 and private and non-profit
insurance most of the rest." (Ginzberg, 1981). The present structure and
future health of the American economy demands an increasing outlay of re-
sources for human capital formation or services. It was within this context
that Ginzberg suggested:
"The U.S. cannot maintain its position among the industrial
nations of the world unless it pursues policies that encourage
the greater use of resources in which the country has gained
a comparative advantage as a result of its generous investment
in human capital...What is needed is not reindustrialization
but revitalization.
Since people represent the principal input of an advanced economy,
and since their contributions will vary according to their endow-
ment, the developmental opportunities and their motivation, the
nation should pursue policies aimed at strengthening its human
resources (Ginzberg, 1981).
Quite clearly the present and future economic structure of the U.S. requires
that at least equal if not greater attention be paid toward expanding and
developing the service domain as has historically been accorded the goods
producing sector. Any redevelopment plan which does not consider the
increasingly important function of the service domain and changing
structure of the economy is doomed to failure. Rohatyn and Stockman have
chosen to develop remedial prescriptions which presume that the present
and future economic structure of the U.S. does and can resemble a 19th
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century goods producing model. Stockman has little understanding of the
shifts in structure. This, in part, explains his interest in grafting a
19th century Laissez Faire model of goods production on an essentially service
economy. Alternatively, Rohatyn has at least a preliminary recognition of
these fundamental changes. This understanding however, is at best super-
ficial given his belief that the trend must be reversed if the society is to
regain its competitive and productive advantage. Such a reversal would re-
quire an increased outlay of resources for traditional goods production
industries and a declining investment in services.
There is one other fundamental flaw in the reinudstrialists' plans, a flaw
that relates directly to the history of human services. There are historical
reasons for the expansion of the service economy. These issues have been
as much ignored by Stockman and Rohatyn as they are experienced and under-
stood by every human service worker.
Economic Development and the Rise of Human Services
As the first sections of this paper make clear, the economic plans of Stockman
and Rohatyn contain a social vision, one that is as fundamental to their
economic scenarios as is a balanced Federal budget. That vision incorporates
an image of communities as organically self-sufficient and, if not homogeneous,
capable of interlacing their personal, familial, and voluntarist supports
together in ways that make "belt tightening" possible. The underside to such
a vision, however, is that such community and familial cohesion must exist if
wide-scale social disruption, with all its attendant costs on a fiscally tight
balanced budget, is to be avoided during the painful process of altering
economic and social priorities.
Even a cursory look at the personal, social, and community supports within
our society today suggests that this vision may be as erroneous as were those
of the anti-industrial Utopians of the 19th century. Their concerns, of
course were social and not economic. Sickened not by the declining rate of
profit but the coarseness of industrial society, they were to call for a
return to a simpler, more pastoral world of the past. They saw industrial
blight, and sought out rural cottage industries; they smelled the filth of
crowded tenements and turned to the expansive countryside for relief; they
grew sick at the sight of emaciated children, and looked to the craft and
agricultural production of small farms as their haven. Unfortunately, when
they attempted to graft their rural vision on to a modern industrial world,
they found that the economic laws of the market had transformed the country-
side, making their dreams impossible. For example, in place of small farms,
complete with close-knit families and dairy cattle, they found huge blocs
of land filled with thousands of wool-growing sheep owned by textile in-
dustrialists (Marx, 1977). Likewise, the small conmodity-producing candle
stick maker, baker, and tinsmith -- all integral to 18th century life --
were gone, driven to urban areas. Their own small, close-knit markets had
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been lost with the rural exodus to the large scale, urban manufacturing dis-
tricts.
The transformed social reality developing alongside the economic drive of 19th
century industrial expansion crushed these dreams quickly. The organic, close-
knit, and self-sufficient units necessary for communal support no longer existed.
If we assume that the economic drives of capital have continued throughout the
20th century, it clearly seems to follow that more social transformation has
occurred. This change has in turn generated further social dislocation and
alteration of community life -- a life that Stockman and Rohaytn must account
for within any viable economic scenario for the future.
Indeed, we can only understand the rise of the late 20th century service
sector as the inevitable institutional response to the further alteration of
social life under American capitalism. For just as large-scale factories of
the 19th century have been replaced by larger-scale, 20th century conglomer-
ates, the social fabric has been altered in even more atomizing, individualized
forms than were seen in the past. If one doubts this, try to identify what
period the following picture describes:
Though only a few miles from the center of the greatest
metropolis of the land, Queens County and much of Brooklyn
were still semirural..., and many families were as depen-
dent on small-scale agriculture as on the industrial com-
mercial employment of the men in the family. North of what
is now the midtown area, Manhattan itself was more bucolic
than urban, and pigs and goats were often seen along the
East River as far south as 42nd Street. At a time when
men worked 10 or 12 hours a day, six days a week, much of
the care of urban livestock and gardens inevitably fell to
women -- quite apart from the fact that such tasks were
theirs by tradition...less than I purchased bread, and
almost all bought huge amounts of flour...with families
averaging 2 pounds of bread and flour consumption a day.
(Smuts, 1971).
The Age of Jackson in the 1820's? Around the Civil War? These statistics
emerged at the turn of the 20th century (Braverman, 1974). The bucolic image
of Brooklyn homemakers baking all their bread and canning their food, let alone
of pigs wandering on 42nd Stree-t, seems far removed from the urban reality of
today. We buy our bread and canned vegetables, which has increased commercial
services substantially. Additionally, 42nd Street's services range from the
worst street hustle to shelters for the 8,000 runaway and abused children who
can be found in the Times Square area on any given day (New York Times, 1980).
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The social fabric is indeed different, and the inexorable drive that re-
industrialization would intensify has made it so. As Braverman wrote:
But the industrialization of food and other elementary
home provisions is only the first stage in a process
which would eventually lead to the dependence of all of
social life and indeed the relatedness of all of human-
kind, upon the marketplace. The population of cities,
more or less completely cut off from a natural environ-
ment by the devision between town and country, becomes
totally dependent upon social artifice for its every
need.. .Thus, the population no longer relies on the
community, elders, children, but with few exceptions
must go to the market and only the market, not only for
food, clothing, and shelter, but also for recreation,
amusement, security, for the care of the young, the old,
the sick, the handicapped...(Braverman, 1974).
It is thus neither accident nor the whim of 19th century "do-gooders" that
produced the modern set of commerical and human service organizations that
interweave within every neighborhood's basic functioning. Be it movie house
or nursing home, supermarket or childcare center, these new organizations
exist because thesocial changes of modern life demanded they be created.
While the ongoing confrontations between classes played no small part in the
development of such services, they wouldn't exist if there had been no
expressed societal need for them (Braverman, 1974). Put simply, the march
from small-scale to large scale capital organizations to world-wide con-
glomerate is matched by the quieter but no less profound steps from tight-
knit families in multi-generational communities to the single-parent or
unmarried, relatively transient individuals of today. The more powerful,
centralized modern economic organization, with widespread needs and far-
flung interests needs the readily available, more atomized individual able to
move quickly or adapt readily to changes in the ever-shifting marketplace.
While materially better off than their 19th century counterparts, there is
little question that they are also more alienated and alone. Lacking the
kinship and communal supports of the past, the late 20th century employee
therefore must look to institutional services in time of need -- mental
health clinics for emotional stress, hospitals for illness, nursing homes
for aged parents, childcare for their young...just the facilities that must
be curtailed under reindustrialization.
The "reindustrialist" are in many ways the Utopians of today, for their
vision calls forth a social image of community and family life that by
definition does not exist. They have one very real advantage over the
Utopians, however -- the institutional and political power to try and make
their vision come to life. It is therefore that much more important analyze
why their plans cannot work. As has been suggested, communities are no longer
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socially equipped to cohere around any widescale set of social problems with-
out broad institutional support. Consequently, the economic plans of
reindustrialization will necessarily create a level of social costs far greater
than ever before -- too great to either balance budgets or curtail large
sections of the social service sector, let along "cure" inflation.
There are innumerable ways in which we can show how the huge social costs of
reindustrialization will undermine economic projections. For example, a
trimmer revenue base can hardly pay for the needed expenditures necessary to
rebuild the deteriorated infrastructure of our cities. For instance,
$33 billion is required for 20% of all bridges that need major repairs or
rebuilding. Additionally, 12,000 miles a year of interstate highways need
upgrading. It has also been suggested that $110 billion is needed to maintain
urban water systems, and that $5.3 billion to refurbish the New York City
Transit system alone (other railway systems for freight on a nationwide level
are staggeringl7h-f-h) (Choate, 1981).
Such infrastructural problems, as anyone who has ridden American mass transit
knows too well, has a direct bearing on economic and community revitalization.
Likewise, others have documented that the huge defense outlays will create an
even greater inflationary spiral in the future (Thurow, 1981). But we intend
to look at the broader implications of service cuts within the social welfare
state itself. What we are arguing is different: namely, that the very process
of cutting the social welfare state, given the transformation of social and
community life over the 20th cnetury, inevitably creates so many social costs
that its fiscal purpose of trimmer public efficiency is an impossibility.
This can be seen through the following examples which were drawn from the
social service literature. While brief and not intended to be all inclusive,
this literature presents a picture of an intensifying cycle of further social
and personal distress that the state will have to address. The medical re-
search by Brenner and Cobb (Brenner, 1977) on the effect of unemployment and
plant relocations (a more devastating problem than unemployment alone, due to
its permanence) upon individual stress is most telling. For every 1% in-
crease in national unemployment, Brenner found that there are 38,886 more
deaths, 20,240 more cardio-vascular failures, 494 more deaths from chirrohis
of the liver from alcoholism and more suicides will occur above annual
averages (Brenner, 1976). Furthermore, those of us in social services know
that imbedded within each stress-laden statistic exists multiple social
realities. Frustrated husbands beat wives, who must seek counseling or
police protection; children upset by family discord truant and their grades
plummet, necessitating further family interventions from the outside.
Eventually, as Brenner documents, such stress culminates in more severe health
and emotional problems, necessitating expensive institutionalization and bed
care. All of this occurs well before his carefully correlated morbidity in-
creases Indeed, the financial costs for increased institutionalization that
are related to unemployment increases are staggering.
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Table I (Brenner, 1977)
Increase in Institutional Use Cost
Suicide 4.1% $ 63 million
Mental Hospitalizations 3.4 82 million
Stress-related physical diseases 1.9 1,372 billion
Homicide 5.7 434 million
These costs are all based on financial data from the early 197e's which, given
inflation rates since then, suggests how much higher they now are. Such figures
also err conservatively by not estimating the loss of wage earnings -- and tax
revenues. As the tax revenues from such earning are part of the reindustri-
alists' assumptions about growth and spending (just as these social costs are
not) their loss from the workforce can only further undercut such plan's
vitality.
Brenner's figures as any social worker knows, suggest that widespread unem-
ployment and plant relocation is as much a process as it is statistical out-
come of dollars and increases in institutionalization. Such lay-offs and
retrenchment do not force people out of work one day and into the hospitals and
clinics the next. Their toll is slow yet cululative.
Let's look more closely at the projected slashes in the services. As the press
has frequently reported, one of President Reagan's most popular campaign slogans
was "Let's Put America Back to Work Again!" The search for funds for investment
capital in high growth industries has necessitated the slashing of the public
and social service sectors -- health service agencies, retail stores, service
firms involved in contract work, etc. But who works in these services? And
where would they go, if laid off?
The reindustrialists might assume that either these workers would easily
transfer to other, skilled jobs opening up in the South and Southwest, or would
stay home and maintain the family while others took over financial responsi-
bilities. This presumption is incorrect, however. The service sector, with
its lower paying and less skilled requirements, is primarily female and dis-
proportionately Black and Latin (Braverman, 1974). Such work has always had its
limitations for either advancement or transfer to other sectors, which explains
in part the non-competitive wages these workers receive (about 40% less than
operatives in large-scale private industry).
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These racial and sexual issues become important when we consider the actual
family responsibilities of service workers. The relatively fluid structure
of the service sector has made it attractive to many women because of the
changed nature of family life in the late 20th century. As the statistics of
every social service agency show, the number of divorced women and single
parent families nearly tripled between 1970 and 1975 (Schorr, 1979). Just as
importantly, the number of children living in one-parent families increasing
by 60% in the last decade. By the age-of 18, nearly one out of two children
will have lived in a single parent household.
Such statistics are magnified for Black and Latin women (Schorr, 1979). The
pressing family needs of many service workers as both breadwinner and
nurturer decrease the likelihood of easy access to skilled and/or distant jobs
(without easily available, inexpensive training). These job losses (given
that their family responsibilities will not cease), will increase this popu-
lation's financial dependency on the state through welfare and welfare-re-
related services. As Great Britain's Margaret Thatcher has found to her
dismay, revenue costs for services have continued to accelerate despite the
drastic slashing of services (New York Times, November 11, 1980). The same
phenomenon was recently documented in the Wall Street Journal, where it was
reported certain states' welfare costs tipled as unemployment increased
(Wall Street Journal, January 28, 1981).
Any social worker experienced with the multiple responsibilities and concerns
of single parents would understand these dynamics immediately. It has been
repeatedly reported that such people have few options beyond the application
for relief. The problems of single parents, have already been acute, and
must be exacerbated by plans of reindustrialization. Studies reveal further
that single parents' children are twice as likely to suffer from moderate to
severe emotional distress, which adds to educational and mental health demands
(Ross, 1975). When one remembers that unemployment in general will increase
the number of single parents (for divorce rates of the unemployed and under-
employed are about 1/3 higher than for those with regular employment , we
can then expect drastic increases in welfare,,unemployment benefits, Medi-
care, etc. This will occur even with a raising of requirements for such
entitlements. After all, larger numbers of people are going to have their
living standards lowered.
*This problem speaks to other financial drains and economic instabilities as
well. First, the unemployment funds of states have been escalating in the
past year where over 11 states averted bankruptcy through Federal assistance--
to the tune of well over $5 billion, money that must be paid for somewhere
and given predictions on unemployment for the next few years, likely to con-
tinue. Furthermore, the loss of such service workers from the job roles means
that they will be spending less and less money on the prepackaged foods and
fast food chains, retail shops, laundries, etc., that they depended upon for
their families' maintenance while they worked Over time, their loss creates
other cutbacks in commerical services, lowering wages and tax revenues, in-
creasing welfare rolls, etc. All of which intensifies the cycle.
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Brenner's broadly-etched statistics are even bleaker -- and financially even
more contradictory -- when we look at the collectively shared problem of crime.
The relationship between unemployment, community supports, and crime is multi-
dimensional. At one level exists the relatively straightforward -- albeit
highly irrational -- financial costs of crime and criminal justice. Ordinary
crime on the streets and in the communities* (as it is imagined by most people)
has increased at a higher rate in the past five years than at any other time in
history. Brenner estimates the increases in prison admissions will cost an
additional $210 million a year (Brenner, 1976). But such figures belie the
financially strained reality of the problem. That reality is best captured in
two recent New York Times headlines that appeared on the same day: "Court
Order May Cut Number of City Jail Inmates" and "1980 Called Worst Year of
Crime in City History." (New York Times, February 28, 1981). At this moment,
I out of 99 convicted felons will go to prison, and yet New York jails are
bulging at 150% capacity (New York Times, February 28, 1981). The two headlines
speak to the social havoc that occurs when people are chronically unemployed in
cities unable to cope with increased service demand. The increased incidence of
crime in turn affects the increased costs of processing cases, lawyer's fees,
social services for families, the period and nature of incarceration as well as
probation/parole services.
In the past such judicial costs, while hardly adequate, minimized state and
city expenditures on capital improvements for prison facilities. Presently,
as Choate and Walker reported, 1,300 of the nation's prisons are at or above
100% capacity. Addit~onally, these facilities are so old they must be rebuilt
or substantially rehabilitated (Choate, 1981). Things have reached such
alarming proportions that much construction is proceeding under court order.
It has therefore been given a legal priority over most other capital expenditures.
With fiscal priorities going to social control and the concurrent increase in
chronic unemployment the vicious "crime-control-costs" cycle will be in-
tensified. Furthermore, except for the brief financial benefits to construction
firms and their employees, this investment produces nothing except the control
facility itself. And as crime rates soar, the processing costs are unrelenting,
further draining a city of needed revenue. The effects of unemployment and
crime go beyond the almost-dizzying circle of cost pushes and pulls of an
overworked, overcrowded, and economically unproductive criminal justice system.
Their effects also relate to an amorphous issue most often called the "quality
of life," that, like air, can't be seen, touched, or heard, but once missing
is desperately needed. "There is a low, mean hiss in the land" is how Flora
Lewis described it, and the image of Detroit she wrote about was frightening:
* The ideological and social reasons for the downplaying of white collar and
corporate crime during times of economic distress needs to be addressed in
any detailed analysis of crime, social justice, and public policy. However,
the subject matter is too broad for our purposes here. See the January, 1981
issue of Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 27, #1 for a thorough review of this
subject.
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In Detroit, writer Betty de Ramos offers some vignettes
of the mood, the smarling, deliverately nasty way people
are coming to treat each other, with no immediate provo-
cation but their own despair. The aggression ranges from
insult, to bashing a stranger's car for no apparent reason,
to casual murder.
The struggle going on in Detroit these days is not just to
survive.. .The struggle is to keep from drowning your
troubles in Mad Dog or shooting your best friend in a
quarrel over 50 cents (Lewis, 1981).
Fear begets fear, which heightens aggression, which leads to violence. On a
collective level, there are now 140 million guns owned by private citizens,
most of whom never hunt game (Lewis, 1981). These numbers suggest the fear
is very active and has contirubuted toward an increasingly inward, insulating
focus on the part of more and more Americans. At a time when people would
seem to need to work together either to fulfill the reindustrialists' assump-
tions about social cohesion or to develop an active counter-response to their
plans, the level of community disorganization and hostility minimizes the
opportunity for collective activity. It is no accident that Detroit's city
streets are completely vacant by 6:00 every day of the week. Nor is it a
sign of social health that 50% of all Americans are afraid to go out at
night because of the fear of crime. The isolation thus continues, which in
turn increases our individual and collective vulnerability.
This collective anomie only thinly disguises the personal and familial tensions
for the perceived victim or potential criminal. The potential victim, if well-
off, more actively spends income on safe housing, either by moving to new
areas or paying premium rents for cramped facilities ($1,200 a month for a
studio on New York's upper East Side is not an unheard of sum). (New York Times,
October 1, 1980). The loss in income from rent mpans less savings, fewer pur-
chases, and, for those who can get it, more work. Such behavior decreases
an individual's potential for social and political activity, while advancing
the economic process of gentrification and housing segregation now common in
every American city (Tabb, 1981). The outcome on both levels is a more
atomized, more fractured community composed of individuals less able to
maintain themselves than in the past.
As for the potential criminal, a brief look at the description of arsonists
gives us an idea of how fulure economic dislocation can only increase social
problems and social costs. The largest number of arsonists have been found
to be young, white males, with a history of educational and interpersonal
problems. They often do poorly in school and at work (New York Times, March 8
1981).
*If not evicted through cooping ventures or forced out through these premium rents,
the most common reaction for the poor, especially the elderly is to stay inside.
All the time.
**We are looking at the arsonist here, not at arson, where the social and economic
reasons are more varied and complex.
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Such personal problems make them likely candidates for firings and lay-offs
which, in a troubled economy, are part of a cost-conscious firm's retrench-
ment policy.
The reindustrialists would suggest, of course, that such firings are necessary --
that the risk of triggering anti-social behavior must be taken, especially since
it is impossible to predict who will or won't commit arson. However, as arsonists
have been found to come from unstable, divorced families where the father was
absent or drank heavily (all measures of increased stress) there will be no-
where in our shrunken social service sector for such individuals to turn, no
preventitive measures available to handle the stress of family and personal
dis-organization. If one assumes that Brenner's figures are correct, then the
increases in unemployment and job loss will mean that more and more previously-
intact families will be disorganized by plant relocation. Consequently, the
likelihood of more anti-social behavior such as arson increases. "The fire
next time," besides being a political metaphor for oppressed rage, becomes the
"fire next door" -- fires which must be paid for by a community-at-large less
and less able to do so.
It is no wonder that almost every statement on reindustrialization at some point
refers darkly to the "potential explosions" that may occur if our society is not
stabilized financially. The brief analysis on the preceding pages, focused on
the relationship between unemployment and stress. It described the institutional
costs, of unemployment and relatedly the complex and costly social problems
which will be spawned by reindustrialization. There are other areas one could
examine, for example, the health costs of increased pollution and diminished
safety regulations that are expected to occur due to different types of de-
regulation -- but the preceding illustrations provide a sufficiently clear out-
line for social workers as to why the reinudstrialists cannot succeed on their
terms, in ending our social and economic problems.
Moral questions concerning the tacit decision to write off an entire generation
of young people, especially minority youth, as our economy is redesigned,
tightened, and retrenched over the 1980's have not been raised. The explosions
of Miami, created by young Blacks quite different from and more despairing than
their predecessors fo the 1960's, is so foreboding because no one is holding
out even a dim promise that their lot will improve, that tomorrow will be a
brighter day (New York Times, April 13, 1980). They know it isn't true, and
they've stopped listening. What such anguish and poverty portends can only
be initially reckoned with in the bleakest of terms by the reinudstrialists --
terms that some of us may wish to struggle against in the future.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, while these two plans have areas of distinctiveness, they share
two fundamental assumptions which undermine any likelihood of success. Both
Rohatyn and Stockman presume that the future productivity of the society is
tied to its 19th century industrial and social base. Consequently, their
plans fall to consider the permanence and dominance of the service features of
the economy. Any plan which is intended to revitalize the economy must
establish (1) definitions of productivity; (2) investment policies and (3) social,
economic and political structures which are consonant with these fundamental
shifts. Quite clearly, Rohatyn and Stockman's plans are in conflict with the
present character, momentum and needs of the American exonomy. They are
therefore doomed at best to fail and at worst to retard the development of
the society and economy.
The service sector exists because community and social needs have been trans-
formed in the 20th century. To imagine that communities can withstand service
cuts to the degree presently proposed without concurrent widescale; increasing
social costs is impossible. The outcome to such problems suggests that the
alternatives for the state will be either (1) revitalization of our economic
and human capital in new or transformed ways; or (2) a heightened level of
state power and control. This fluid political context provides human service
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